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Problemstellung und Schlußfolgerungen
German Introduction
Political Change in Egypt
The Parliamentary Elections of 2000 and
Horizons of Reform
Warum sollten die ägyptischen Parlamentswahlen des
Jahres 2000 eine ausführliche Analyse wert sein?
Haben Wahlen in Ägypten sich nicht oft genug als
Farce − man denke vor allem an das 94-Prozent-Ergeb-
nisse der letzten Präsidentenwahl − und hat das ägyp-
tische Parlament sich nicht als Feigenblatt eines letzt-
lich autoritären Regimes erwiesen? Ist nicht die ins-
gesamt geringe Wahlbeteiligung bei den Parlaments-
wahlen ein klares Zeichen dafür, daß auch die ägyp-
tische Bevölkerung diesen Wahlen keine Relevanz
zumißt?
Die Realität ist auch hier komplizierter. Ägyptens
Parlamentswahlen sind anders als die Präsident-
schaftswahlen − oder richtiger: Referenden − Aus-
druck politischer Pluralität, die auch echte Konkur-
renz zwischen Kandidaten und Parteien zuläßt. Die
Wahlen sind nicht unbedingt sauber, aber Über-
raschungen sind möglich. Das hat die deutliche
Niederlage gezeigt, die die regierende Nationaldemo-
kratische Partei (NDP) Präsident Mubaraks bei den
Wahlen des Jahres 2000 erlitten hat − eine unerwar-
tete Niederlage, nachdem die Partei doch noch 1995,
mit deutlicher Manipulation, mit über 95 Prozent der
Sitze aus den Wahlen hervorgegangen war.
Die Niederlage eines großen Teils der NDP-Kandi-
daten ist wesentlich das Ergebnis der erstmaligen
Überwachung des Wahlvorgangs durch unabhängige
Richter. Die ägyptische Justiz hat im allgemeinen
einen guten Ruf. Daß bei den Wahlen des Jahres 2000
nun die Wahllokale unter die Aufsicht von Richtern
gestellt wurden, ist selbst das Ergebnis einer politisch-
juristischen Auseinandersetzung um die Art und
Weise, wie das Wahlrecht sich materialisiert, an der
oppositionelle Politiker, Parlament und Regierung,
der Staatspräsident und die Justiz beteiligt waren. Im
Ergebnis hat diese Auseinandersetzung die rechts-
staatlichen Elemente in Ägypten gestärkt.
Darüber hinaus reflektieren die Parlamentswahlen,
und reflektiert auch das Feld der Kandidaten und
Kandidatinnen, die über die Wahlen ihren Anspruch
auf aktive Teilnahme am politischen Entscheidungs-
prozeß ausgedrückt haben, sozio-politische Verände-
rungen in Ägypten, deren mittelfristige Bedeutung
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nicht zu unterschätzen ist, insbesondere die all-
mähliche Ablösung einer Generation, die noch durch
den Oktober-Krieg (1973) und die ihm folgenden
politischen Entwicklungen geprägt war, durch eine
neue, die vielleicht am ehesten durch die wirtschaft-
lichen Liberalisierungsbemühungen der 90er Jahre
und die Durchsetzung von Globalisierungselementen
geprägt ist.
Im übrigen ist das ägyptische Parlament auch ein
Forum für Auseinandersetzungen um die mittel- und
langfristigen Entwicklungen des politischen Systems.
Die Parlamente arabischer Staaten mögen eine Aus-
drucksform autoritärer Herrschaft sein − oft margina-
lisiert, oft ohne die Kapazität, um strategische Ent-
scheidungen wirksam zu steuern, und oftmals aus
zweifelhaften Wahlen hervorgegangen −, sie sind
aber, wie eine jüngere vergleichende Studie belegt
(Baaklini / Denoeux / Springborg 1999), gleichzeitig
ein unerläßliches Element der Transition von autori-
tären zu pluralistischen oder gar demokratischen
Systemen, die als Arena politischer Auseinander-
setzungen friedliche Lösungen von Konflikten
befördern und darüber selbst zur Herauskristallisie-
rung eines demokratischen Ethos gerade der nach-
wachsenden politischen Eliten beitragen können. Dies
gilt sicherlich auch für Ägypten. Allerdings wird der
Pluralisierungsprozeß auf parlamentarischer Ebene
durch negative Entwicklungen konterkariert, die das
Verhältnis von Staat und kritischen Nichtregierungs-
organisationen betreffen. Die Verurteilung des renom-
mierten Soziologen Saad Eddin Ibrahim im Mai 2001
zeigt, daß gerade Aktivisten und Organisationen, die
im Menschenrechtsbereich arbeiten, sehr eindeutig in
ihre Schranken gewiesen werden.
Für deutsche und europäische Politik läßt sich aus
der hier vorgelegten Studie von Gamal Abdel Nasser,
einem Mitglied des SWP-Forschungsprojekts zum
Elitenwechsel in der arabischen Welt, vor allem die
Konsequenz ziehen, daß sich die bilateralen Beziehun-
gen mit Ägypten und anderen Staaten des Nahen und
Mittleren Ostens nicht auf die Exekutiven beschrän-
ken sollten. Die Parlamente dieser Länder haben eine
Funktion, und ihre Mitglieder sind eher als andere
Segmente der politischen Eliten an einer weiteren
Institutionalisierung, Pluralisierung und Demokrati-
sierung politischer Prozesse interessiert. Die Position
der Parlamente im politischen System dieser Länder
wird stärker werden, wenn auch das Ausland sie ernst
nimmt.
Volker Perthes
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Overview
During October and November 2000, in the shadow of
a strained regional atmosphere following the onset of
the al-Aqsa Intifada in the Palestinian Territories and
the call for an extraordinary Arab summit in Cairo,
Egypt held its seventh parliamentary elections since
the introduction of the multi-party system in 1976.
These elections were for the first time carried out
under judicial supervision in three consecutive stages
from October 18th to November 14th. During the first
two rounds respectively nine governorates were
holding elections. In the third round the inhabitants
of Cairo, Giza and six other governorates were going
to the polls. Over 4,000 candidates representing
diverse political currents, among them members of
the illegal Muslim Brotherhood who participated as
independent individuals, contested 444 parliamentary
seats in 222 constituencies.
The elections resulted in the replacement of more
than two-thirds of the parliamentarians. 329 mem-
bers1 of the outgoing parliament lost their seats, and
277 members entered parliament for the first time in
their life. The ruling party witnessed unprecedented
losses whereas the opposition won 13 per cent of the
seats. On its vanguard were members of the banned
Muslim Brotherhood who returned to the arena after
ten years of absence. Three Christian candidates were
elected. Female candidates kept their percentage of
parliamentary seats.2 Businessmen and small entre-
preneurs, representing various spheres of activity,
doubled their seats. In compliance with the Nasserist
legacy that at least 50 per cent of the seats have to be
occupied by peasants and workers, the leading trade
unionists as well as the most important peasant
unionists also entered the parliament.3 The only top
officials and ministers who stood for election were the
head of the Presidential Court (Zakariya Azmi), the
Minister of Agriculture (Yussuf Wali), the State
Minister of Parliamentary Affairs (Kamal ash-Shazli),
the State Minister of Military Production (Sayyed
Mashcal), the Minister for Irrigation (Mahmud Abu
1  317 members of the ruling National Democratic Party, 6 depu-
ties of 3 opposition parties and 6 independents. The election
results are taken from the daily press or from Mustafa 2001.
2  Seven women made it to the Assembly.
3  173 ‘workers’ and 55 ‘peasants’ were elected.
Zeid), the Minister of Housing (Ibrahim Suleiman), and
the Minister of Economy and Foreign Trade (Yussuf
Boutros Ghali), since they enjoy the highest popularity
and held some of the most important portfolios.
The new parliament will have to face a number of
thorny issues which have been postponed several
times. Generally speaking, they concern the
construction of a legal base for economic reforms that
allows the liberalization of labor law and landlord-
tenant relations. The solution of these pressing issues
will also pave the way to consider the ratification of
the partnership agreement with the European Union,
which was initialled on January 26, 2001, and is
expected to come into effect in the year 2005. More-
over, there are other urgent issues related to reform-
ing the status of women, regulating the activities of
non-governmental organizations and to the questions
of freedom of expression and public ethics.
In light of the last elections, this paper will con-
centrate on political reform, elite formation and
change in Egypt. Contrary to widely held assumptions
(al-Gamal 1999; Kassem 1999; Kienle 2001), one of the
best mechanisms for understanding changes both in
Egyptian society and within the political elites are
elections.4 Elections in Egypt disclose the patterns of
representation of every social group, in rural as well as
urban areas, and reflect the patterns of choosing an
elite. This paper thereby assumes that the parliament
is not cut off from society but is an integral part of the
social body. Even if the different social and religious
groups are not represented proportionally in any
democracy, the composition of parliamentary elites is
not disconnected from society and not from changes
in society. Furthermore, it is useful to classify the ways
in which elites are chosen according to four criteria.
4  Mostly, two approaches are used in order to study the
representation of society. The macrological approach
presents a classical analysis of election results; the micro-
logical approach starts from one village, one electoral district
or one candidate and generalises its conclusions. This paper
is part of a broader project which tries to combine both levels
through a database collecting the biographical data from 400
ministers and governors between 1971 and 2000 as well as
from candidates of the parliamentary elections in 1990, 1995
and 2000 initiated by the author at the CEDEJ in Cairo.
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Historical Background
After the defeat of the Arab armies in the 1948 war
against Israel and the establishment of the Israeli
state, a political elite emerged led by a new gener-
ation of young military officers. They came from the
middle classes and adhered to a pan-Arab, nation-
alist ideology. In the majority of the Arab countries,
this elite displaced the traditional elite. Its legiti-
macy was based on two elements: its successful anti-
colonial fight and its major reform projects. A social
contract emerged that found its expression in, e.g.,
quota for workers and peasants in parliament
which have been preserved until today.
The legitimacy of these nationalist young
officers began to fade with the failure of the pan-
Arab experiment of unification between Syria and
Egypt, i.e., the United Arab Republic that lasted
from 1958 to 1961 only. The deep conflict between
the two camps of “progressive” and “reactionary”
countries (i.e., the republics and the monarchies in
the region) that was propagated by Nasserist
thinking and which culminated in a violent con-
frontation between the two camps in the Yemen
war of 1962-67 also added to the demise of the
romanticism of pan-Arab nationalism. The national
movement suffered its final blow after the defeat in
the 1967 war. By now it had lost its legitimacy in
the eyes of its people once and for all. The result of
this defeat, especially in the states surrounding
Israel, was a ‘purification’ of the whole military
elite. This elite change was at that time labeled
“replacing the technocrats with bureaucrats”. In
the end, constitutional legitimacy replaced the
revolutionary legitimacy.
Contrary to the period where the Arab world
witnessed constant changes of regimes, since 1973
the heads of states have stayed in power for a life-
time. However, in the last 25 years their legitimacy
has been more and more challenged by Islamist
forces. Internal economic difficulties, foreign debt
crises, the opening-up of the economy to the
capitalistic world market, the widening gap between
oil-producing and non-oil-producing countries and
the effects of structural adjustment programs
provoked major societal contestations, such as the
bread riots in Egypt in 1977 and the riots by police
forces in 1986. All of this strengthened the Islamist
movement. Its moderate wing represented the urban
middle classes and its extremist wing accommo-
dated the urban poor as well as the poor peasants in
the countryside who had profited at first from the
new upward mobility starting in the post-colonial
period. The conflict between the Islamists and the
secular nationalists dominated the Arab states all
throughout the nineties.
The transformation entered another stage after
the Second Gulf War with cautious and slow but
solidly. In its aftermath, Egypt’s foreign military
debt was canceled completely by the United States,
half of the civilian debts were rescheduled, the peace
process gained speed with the Madrid conference in
1991 and the Islamic revolution in Iran lost more
and more of its appeal for other Muslim countries.
These circumstances allowed Egypt to enter a phase
of liberalization and privatization. For this phase to
continue, two reciprocal factors are essential:
Regional stability, especially regarding the peace
process with Israel, and an increase in economic
resources for development. Without these two
factors the optimistic scenario drawn in this paper
will not come into being.
The first is a geographical one; the second is a class
criterion; the third criterion divides the elites accord-
ing to their (religious or political) affiliation; and the
fourth criterion asks for what could be called “physi-
cal identity”, such as age, gender and ethnic origin.
Political representation is based on these four closely
interwoven criteria of choice. In order to recognize
change, the author suggests comparing Egypt’s politi-
cal landscape and the composition of its political elite
with the situation ten, twenty or thirty years ago
rather than with other countries.
The paper relies on three main sources: the imme-
diate observation of political changes in Egypt, the
constitutional and legal provisions as well as press
files covering the elections5 and various essays and
studies. It is divided into two main sections. The first
part is dedicated mainly to topics related to the parlia-
ment, its formation, composition and changes that
can be observed, and its position within the state’s
structure. The second part will then concentrate on
political reform issues in the short and the long run.
However, borders are not always clear-cut as the issues
discussed in both of them are closely interwoven.
5  Al-Ahram and al-Ahram Weekly were regularly evaluated
between September 2000 and May 2001.
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The Formation of the New People’s Assembly 2000–2005
Towards the Rule of Law
Until 2000, the general election code, law 63/1956
(qanun bi-tanzim mubasharat al-huquq as-siyasiya), had
assigned the supervision of the voting committees to
officials from the governmental administration and
the public sector units. It was always suspected that
these officials were biased or yielded to directives and
pressures from the administration to falsify the
election results by using voting cards of citizens who
had not gone to the polls. After a judgement of the
Supreme Constitutional Court in July 2000 stated that
it was unconstitutional to allow persons other than
members of the judicial authority to chair the polls,
the election code had to be amended. Consequently,
the general election committees in the constituencies
and the sub-committees at each polling station were
chaired by judges − who do not practice politics − for
the first time in 2000. The Egyptian judiciary is gener-
ally acknowledged as an independent and impartial
force.
Anticipating this judgement, the parliament
(People’s Assembly) had already initiated a process to
amend the election code. But it rejected the idea that
every single committee had to be chaired by a judge
since about 10,000 members of the judiciary did not
suffice to preside over 42,000 polling stations. The
Assembly’s viewpoint was supported by the Minister of
Justice. When the opposition suggested holding the
election in multiple stages, the ruling party responded
that this was not feasible from a security as well as
administrative point of view and that it also violated
the election law which prescribed to hold the elec-
tions simultaneously in all constituencies. The
Assembly then concluded what it considered to be a
compromise. It retained the former system that judges
preside over the 222 general election committees (one
judge per constituency) and introduced a new require-
ment that every judge be assisted by a group of judges
who would then move among the polling stations on
the election day in order to supervise the 180 sub-
committees in every electoral district. The Assembly
deemed this sufficient to secure the safety and impar-
tiality of the election process.
Shortly afterwards, however, the Supreme Consti-
tutional Court issued its ruling which rendered the
amendment made by the Assembly void. The president
of the republic then practiced his constitutional right
to issue decrees that have the power of a law and
called the Assembly for an urgent session to adopt the
court decision. During this session the parliament
approved by consensus what it had rejected before: to
hold the elections in 26 governorates at three con-
secutive stages, to reduce the number of polling
stations to about 16,000 (i.e., one third6) and to
mobilize about two-thirds of the judges and one-third
of the prosecutors (i.e., 6,500 altogether) to chair
them. This process shows how elements of rule of law
start to gain ground.
Patterns of Elite Choice
There are distinctive differences between con-
stituencies in Egypt with regard to the percentage of
voter turn out. The turn-out declines clearly as we
move from the desert constituencies, the governorates
at the border and rural areas (70% in average) towards
the capitals of the governorates (about 30%) and
finally to major cities like Cairo and Alexandria (about
15%). Even within the urban centers, voter turn-out
drops as we move from the poor, informally-built,
popular districts to the middle-class constituencies.
Voter turn-out is at its lowest in the upper-class
districts. The higher the level of urbanization and
education, the lower the voters’ interest and partici-
pation. This inverse relation is often said to reflect the
negative attitude of intellectuals towards the political
process in Egypt: the underlying assumption being
that participation in the vote would not have any
relevance for political outcomes.
This voting behavior also indicates that political
participation in Egypt is still exercised collectively in
many places. The high turn-out of voters in rural areas
reflects the solidarity of the desert tribes, of the
extended family, of the guilds, of the employees in
6  This led to some confusion in the end as voters had
difficulties finding their polling station.
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Legislation
The People’s Assembly is the genuine but not the
sole authority in legislation. The president of the
republic shares this power with the Assembly in
two cases: (a) when the Assembly authorizes him,
and (b) when the Assembly is inoperative, i.e., when
it is not convened, or when it has been dissolved.
Also, a constitutional amendment made at the
beginning of the 1980s introduced the principle of
sharing the legislative authority between two
chambers. Accordingly, the second chamber, the
Majlis ash-Shura (Consultative Council)7 was estab-
lished but was only given a consultative role in the
following cases: (a) proposals for constitutional
amendments and draft laws complementary to the
constitution, (b) the draft of the country’s general
plan for economic and social development, (c) peace
treaties, alliances and all treaties affecting the terri-
torial integrity of the state, (d) draft laws referred to
the Assembly by the president, and (e) whatever
matters referred to the Assembly by the president
that relate to the general policy of the state and its
policy regarding Arab or foreign affairs.
Although the president does not exercise his
legislative power extensively, he exercises it con-
cerning the most important laws, i.e., those that
may be described as complementary to the con-
stitution and relate to the redistribution of power
between the state institutions. The president’s law
concerning judicial supervision of elections is an
ideal example. Here the president intervened to
resolve what seemed a conflict of power between
the state’s institutions when both the parliament
and the government refused the judicial super-
vision of elections. After the court ruling the parlia-
mentary term had ended, the Assembly was not
convened, and the president issued his decree, not
only as a legislator but also as an arbitrator
between the state authorities. Then he called the
Assembly for an extraordinary session to adopt the
decree. When the president legislates, the Assembly
cannot amend the provisions. The Assembly will
either adopt the law as a whole or revoke it.
major industries and of the immigrants from a com-
mon region gathered in semi-urban or urban centers.
7  285 members form the Majlis ash-Shura. Two thirds are
elected directly and one third is appointed by the president
for a period of six years.
Here, decision-making is still a patriarchal process.
The head of a tribe, the father, the elder statesmen,
the mayor, the employer or the landowner votes for
his subordinates. The law responds to such customs.
It allows the voter to choose his or her constituency
according to the birthplace, the principal workplace
or the current domicile. Thus, a voter living in the
capital may vote in a constituency in the countryside
or close to his workplace rather than his residence.
Correspondingly, the law allows a candidate to run for
election in a constituency other than that in which
he/she is registered as a voter. Thus, a resident of an
urban area may stand for elections in a rural area.
Also, an employer, for example, residing in a rich
district, may be a candidate in a poor popular area
where his factory or enterprise is located.
This pattern is reinforced by the fact that the
constituencies’ boundaries are not necessarily con-
gruent with geographical units. Areas that are
geographically disconnected may be combined
together to tailor a homogenous constituency based
on professional, class or sectarian principles or on
common origin. The electoral district of the Coptic
candidate Yussuf Boutros Ghali, for example, is a
patchwork out of several districts with a Coptic
majority which are not linked geographically.
Similarly, the district won by the Minister of Military
Production is located in the south of Cairo and
regroups areas with a high percentage of workers
from the military industry. The third minister who
ran in an artificial electoral district is the Minister of
Housing. His constituency was in Fatimid Cairo
where the biggest area of slums is found.
Participation on the basis of a collective pattern
also entails that a few individuals vote on behalf of
their absent relatives. Thus, the head of a polling
station in the countryside would feel no inhibitions in
allowing a handful of persons to vote on behalf of
hundreds of their relatives, even though this is legally
an act of falsification. However, this falsification
illustrates the paradox of customary law versus civil
law in Egypt more than demonstrating a moral or
behavioral value.
Increasingly, over the last few years there have been
indications that this collective voting pattern is being
dismantled. The most apparent indication is the rising
number of candidates (in 2000 more than double the
number than in 1990). This testifies to mounting
rivalry amongst candidates belonging to the same
social group and mostly also to the same party as well
as to a fragmentation of the voting blocks. It also
The Quota for Workers and Peasants
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shows an increasing social mobility as a result of a
more open system of education on the one hand, and
an increasing individualism as a result of the inter-
nalization of a capitalist rationale on the other. These
two factors help the individual to emerge from the
patriarchal authority of his or her group. More and
more individuals seek autonomous norms on the basis
of which they decide themselves for a candidate. These
norms are based much more on the efficiency of a
candidate than his age, reputation or social position.
New norms for participating in elections emerge and
create a new ruling elite.
Putting the election under judicial supervision is
part of this change. With a judge presiding the polling
station, voters will no longer be allowed to exercise
another voter’s right to vote. Consequently, a can-
didate can no longer be sure that he will win if he
only convinces a group’s “patriarch” to vote for him.
Rather, he will now have to convince the individual
group members to do so as well. The credibility
emanating from judicial supervision of elections
could thus encourage more active participation of
marginalized candidates and voters as well as initiate
more competition and diversity.
For this to happen, however, the reform of the
election code can only be a beginning which needs to
be followed by further steps. First of all, there should
be uniform criteria for choosing the constituency in
which a person votes (preferably the domicile) in order
to update the electoral register, which is at present
misleading in every aspect. The manual registration
method should be substituted by an electronic
method linked with the national identity number − a
program which is currently under implementation.8
8  The manual registration method is problematic for three
main reasons. First, information circulates via non-computer-
ized  channels. Second, several agencies are involved in the
process: lists of those who were born and those who have
died are passed from the Ministry of Health to the Ministry of
Interior who then passes them to the respective police
stations where the voters are expected to register. Similarly,
the Ministry of Interior is informed by the Ministry for
Defense about current draftees and by the Ministry of Labor
about Egyptian migrant workers abroad, both of which are
not entitled to vote. Third, the possibility of registering either
at one’s place of birth, one’s principal place of work, or one’s
place of residence increases the potential of chaos. This
process leaves lots of space for  irregularities in the regis-
tration and during the actual voting process to occur.
The Quota for Workers and Peasants
The Constitution grants workers and peasants a quota
of at least 50 per cent of the seats in all legislative
councils, which is a legacy of the Nasserist social
contract. The law defines these two groups based on
the source and level of income. A peasant is an
individual who earns his main income from agri-
culture and does not possess or rent more than 10
feddans (about four hectares). A worker is an indi-
vidual who earns his income from practicing lower-
skill jobs and whose education certificate when he
first entered a career was below the university level.
The law stipulates that a peasant candidate must
reside in the countryside, and that the worker
candidate must be a member of one of the trade
unions of the Egyptian Trade Union Federation, which
is the only central trade union organization in the
country. Any other candidates are grouped in a
residual category called fi’at.9
The voters can choose two candidates in every con-
stituency. In vote counting, the quota is then taken
into consideration. This means that in case two fi’at
candidates win the election and the third position is
taken by a worker, either the worker will ascend or
the election will be repeated between the two can-
didates running under the fi’at category. A party can-
not nominate two candidates from the fi’at but it can
nominate two workers.
Trade union leaders are the beneficiaries of this
system even if they have a very high income. Tradi-
tionally, one of the two deputy speakers of the
People’s Assembly is the Head of the Egyptian Trade
Union Federation. Law No. 36/1972, together with the
trade union law, granted members of this elite the
privilege to count as workers and maintain their
parliamentary seat throughout about thirty years. A
candidate who had started as a simple worker, with-
out a university degree and with a limited wage, then
later obtained a university degree and held a mana-
gerial position or worked in trade and finally became
a millionaire would continue to qualify as a ‘worker’.
The rationale behind this was to reward the old trade
union elite through this privilege for their acqui-
escence to the process of economic transformation
during the last decades and the 1990s in particular
and their contribution to managing social stability
during these years.
9  214 candidates entered the current parliament repre-
senting this category.
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Only prior to the 2000 elections, the former
People’s Assembly started to rectify the ‘fixing’ of the
electoral category to prevent what was called “uncon-
stitutional actions”. This reform (Law 13/2000)
intended to change the situation so that the electoral
category would express the candidates’ actual legal
and financial status. It therefore could have opened
the door for displacing many of the present trade
union leaders. However, many candidates were
allowed to stand for election without changing their
electoral attributes as ‘workers’ or ‘peasants’. Thus the
administrative courts had to consider hundreds of
appeals against the electoral attribute used. But as the
judgements of the Administrative Court do not have
the power to annul the membership of the People’s
Assembly after its formation, suspicions about
whether the reform project was abided by continue
to persist.
Will the present People’s Assembly witness a judge-
ment from the Supreme Constitutional Court invali-
dating its formation? Since the court took eight years
to pass its ruling concerning the supervision by
members of the judiciary over the election com-
mittees, it is not likely that this is going to take place
during the current parliamentary term. This earlier
long judicial process not only allowed the 1990–1995
Assembly (whose formation was contested as unconsti-
tutional) to complete its term, but also allowed for the
formation of the subsequent Assembly (1995–2000) on
the basis of the same outdated principles. Despite the
independent role that the Court has played in the last
20 years, it seems that the Supreme Constitutional
Court has acted in accordance with what it perceived
as political priorities of the country.10 Interestingly,
for instance, the court acted faster than usual to rule
that the election codes on the basis of which the
respective parliaments had been elected were uncon-
stitutional when in 1983–1987 and 1987–1990 the
assemblies had the highest representation of oppo-
sition parties and of the Islamist opposition in par-
ticular ever.11 The decisions let in both cases to the
dissolution of the assemblies.
What could happen during the current term is that
the Assembly intervenes to reach a redefinition of
10  For a more detailed discussion of the relation between the
Supreme Court and politics in Egypt see Abdelnasser 1999.
11  Due to the electoral regulations of the time, the Islamists
ran as candidates on the lists of other opposition parties.
Al-Wafd and the Muslim Brotherhood had 13 per cent of the
Assembly’s seats in 1983–1987, and the Islamist alliance had
22 per cent of the Assembly’s seats in 1987–1990.  
both ‘workers’ and ‘peasants’ and thereby reconstitute
part of its legitimacy. This redefinition should con-
form to the rising level of qualification of the labor
force. With the restructuring of technical education, a
new spectrum of workers and of peasants with higher
education and income has emerged. A redefinition of
the ‘worker’ and ‘peasant’ category would heavily
influence the composition of the next parliament and
reflect a new social contract.
The Assembly and the Judiciary
The lower courts do not have the power to abrogate
the formation of the Assembly. As soon as the
Ministry of Interior announces the election results
and the deputies take the legal oath, the Assembly
becomes the sole authority to resolve issues related
to the validity of its membership. Consequently,
neither the administrative courts’ rulings nor those
of the court of appeal on objections to the election
procedures can automatically invalidate the mem-
bership of the deputies. These judgements become
mere reports submitted to the Assembly which may
adopt them and vote to abrogate the membership
by the majority of two-thirds, or disregard them
completely.
The Assembly’s negative stance concerning
rulings against dozens of its members during all
the previous formations had negative effects on its
legitimacy. In 2000 the Assembly regained some of
its credibility due to the judicial supervision of the
electoral process. However, the objections raised
lately concerning the electoral attributes of the can-
didates are no less important.
“Party-ism”
Rotation of power between the competing political
parties is not on the reform agenda in the foreseeable
future, because this would necessitate the amendment
of the constitution which gives the president alone
the power to form the government irrespective of a
party’s share of seats in the Assembly. It is a govern-
ment of the president not of the parties. But in the
light of the election results, several political parties
are expected to play a more important role in political
life. This will happen by disengaging the ruling party
apparatus from the apparatus of the state and by
broadening the participation and representation of
the opposition parties in the latter.
“Party-ism”
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The Ruling Party
The ruling National Democratic Party (NDP), chaired
by the president of the republic, seems to be suffering
from a “crisis of abundance”. It is the sole party that
has candidates in all 444 seats. Wherever more party
members wanted to run for elections, they had to
present themselves as independent candidates. In
2000, the party’s candidates won only 38 per cent of
the parliamentary seats against 47 per cent for the
independents. This was the first time that the “party’s
independent candidates” overran the party’s can-
didates. Those “independents” do not owe their
success to the party. One may therefore interpret this
as an indicator of the party’s deteriorating popularity.
The voters have punished the party by giving their
votes to candidates not chosen by the NDP. It is also
possible to consider the success of the independents
over the party candidates as a sign of the people’s
desire for change, in spite of the party’s announce-
ment that it had already changed 40 per cent of its
candidates; or it could have been an endeavor on the
part of the voters to test the credibility of these elec-
tions. The observer may even deduce all the above
together.
The NDP’s reactions to the election results suggest
that the party must have come to similar conclusions.
What was called in the press “a humiliating defeat”
and “a party out of touch” was a starting-point for the
NDP to replace its second and third-rank functionaries
and introduce internal reforms, especially after 10 of
the party’s local secretaries and eight of its heads of
parliamentary committees had lost their seats. These
reforms are conducted on two levels. On a vertical
level, local leaders are chosen more and more through
elections on the grassroots level instead of being
appointed by the central leadership. On a horizontal
level, the party’s apparatus is separated from the state
apparatus so that the party will appear as an organi-
zation autonomous from the state. Thus it is currently
under discussion that officials should no longer
acquire party membership automatically by virtue of
their executive positions. 12 Similarly, the separation
of the NDP chairmanship from the presidency of the
state is debated. Before Camp David (1978) when
Anwar Sadat decided to take over the leadership of the
12  Currently whoever would  be appointed, for instance,
director of an administrative unit, would by mere virtue of
occupying this position automatically become a member of
the NDP if he has not been a member earlier.
NDP, the prime minister not the president chaired the
Arab Socialist Party (the predecessor of the present
NDP). In the context of the tremor caused by Sadat’s
visit to Jerusalem, the beginning of the first Camp
David talks and the early signs of the Islamic Revo-
lution in Iran, it was decided that the president
himself should chair the ruling party.
The Opposition Parties
The opposition parties except the Islamic current
seem to suffer from “scarcity”. Only three of the 14
opposition parties stood for election in 2000. But even
they were unable to put forth candidates all over the
country even if we add the independents adhering to
the different currents of the opposition.13 The liberal
Wafd party could only nominate a candidate in 60 per
cent of the electoral districts and finally won seven
seats. The leftist socialist current, with its two wings,
the Tagammu party and the Nasserist Party, had even
more problems covering the whole country. The
Tagammu nominated candidates in 10 per cent of the
constituencies and won six seats in the current parlia-
ment. The Nasserist party covered six per cent and
won two seats. Two indicators show their weak
position: First, the total number of their parliamen-
tary seats (15) did not increase over three successive
parliamentary terms. Second, they won fewer seats
than the independent candidates unofficially running
for the banned Muslim Brotherhood (17 seats).
All the opposition parties suffer from a weak
organizational structure. They lack an effective basis
in the governorates and local communities. Their
activities are limited to their party headquarter offices
in Cairo and Alexandria and sometimes do not exceed
the respective press activity. They may be described as
parties encapsulated in their newspapers and party
offices. One could also describe them as “newspapers
with a party”, rather than political parties with a
newspaper. Their most effective role lies in high-
lighting the necessity to abrogate the state of emer-
gency. After the elections, also the opposition called
for new methods to choose and renew their leader-
ship.
13  The independents form over 75 per cent of the candidates.
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The Islamic Current
During the 1990s, after in the 1980s Egypt had
witnessed the apex of Islamist influence and its
highest representation in parliamentary councils so
far (five parliamentary seats from 1987 to 1990), the
state launched a comprehensive campaign against the
three wings of the Islamic current: the Muslim
Brotherhood, the Labor Party, and the Gama’at
Islamiyya. In addition to the military campaign
against armed Islamist groups and the arrest of
thousands of group members under the emergency
law, the state hampered the representation of the
Muslim Brotherhood in all elected councils (such as
the professional syndicates, the parliament, the trade
unions, the local councils, etc.). The Labor party,
known for its Islamic orientation, was subject to con-
tinuous security and judicial chases. This culminated
in a decision of the Parties’ Affairs Committee to
freeze the party’s activities and close down its head-
quarters before the elections in 2000 in order to
prevent it from participating. It seemed that by the
end of the 90s some reconciliation between the state
and the radical fundamentalist groups had taken
place as some of their arrested members were released
and the Gama’at Islamiyya, which is the largest
radical group, announced a cease-fire in March 1999.
It was within this framework that the outlawed
Muslim Brotherhood returned to participate in the
2000 parliamentary elections. The elections took place
while the leaders of the Muslim Brotherhood were
tried by a military court in what is known as the
“professional-syndicates lawsuit”. Therefore their can-
didates ran as independents and originated mostly
from the second rank. For the first time the Muslim
Brotherhood nominated a woman in order to counter
accusations that they underrate the women’s status.
In spite of the chases made by the state security prose-
cutor (an extraordinary investigation organ) and the
arrest of hundreds of members of the Muslim Brother-
hood during the election campaigns, 17 candidates
were elected into the new parliament. They form the
largest opposition block with more seats than all of
the “legal” opposition parties together. They testify
overwhelming vitality and represent the most serious
threat to the ruling party. In case the state of emer-
gency is abrogated or the Muslim Brotherhood
becomes a legal party, it will pose a serious challenge
to the political regime and its credibility.
Genuine Independents
Twenty-one parliamentary members have not aligned
with any party, and therefore are referred to here as
‘genuine independents’. But observers classify them
according to their political leanings. Fourteen − in-
cluding 10 businessmen − are close to the liberal Wafd
party. Five are close to the Nasserists and two are
closer to the Islamists.
The political chart of the parliament may thus be
finally read as follows: the NDP comes in the vanguard
with 388 seats (87%) which includes those NDP
members that had run as independent candidates,
followed by the liberals (22 seats, 5%), the Islamic
current (19 seats, 4%) and finally the leftist parties (13
seats, 3%).14 Consequently, the opposition has 54 seats
or over 10 per cent, which is constitutionally suf-
ficient to demand a motion of no confidence against
the government or one of its ministers. If the
opposition would unite for the first time since the
establishment of the Republic, this would be an
unprecedented but possible move.
The Assembly and the Government
The Assembly acts in a supervisory role vis-à-vis the
government through a specialized technical agency
(al-jihaz al-markazi lil-muhasabat) that politically
belongs to the Assembly, but does not have the
right to topple the government. The president
solely has the power to form the government or to
dissolve it. But the Assembly has the right to make a
motion of no confidence against the government or
one of its ministers when this is demanded by one
tenth of its members. If the motion is adopted by
simple majority in the Assembly, the matter will be
submitted to the president to resolve it. He may dis-
solve the government, dismiss the minister or refer
the matter to a public referendum. If the result of
the referendum is in support of the government,
the Assembly will be considered dissolved.
14  Two parliamentary seats are still vacant as the election
results of one district have not yet been published (for back-
ground see next page), which is why the percentages given
here only amount to 99 per cent. The calculations also do not
include the 10 parliamentarians that are appointed by the
president.  
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Emerging Groups
Women
The Egyptian constitution has granted women the
political rights of candidacy and voting since 1956. A
quota for women’s participation in the People’s
Assembly was determined only once. During the 1979–
1984 term, women were assigned 35 seats in chosen
constituencies. This was part of a package of laws
aimed at improving the status of women. The package
carried the name of the former First Lady of Egypt,
Gihan Sadat, and was revoked quickly after a court
ruling stated that these laws were not constitutional −
under pressure from wide opposition in social and
political circles reflecting, among others, the growing
influence of the Islamic current.
In the year 2000, the status of women resurfaced as
one of the major topics of the political agenda. It
started with the promulgation of Law No. 1/2000 that
amended the personal status law and for the first time
granted women the right to ask for divorce without
specified reasons before the court (al-Khul’a).15 Passing
the law underwent serious obstacles after a severe
conflict of opinions in elite circles and public opinion.
The year ended with the fomation of the National
Council for Women, a high-level organization that
combines governmental and non-governmental
women’s organizations and aims to promote the
status of women.
Women’s participation in the 2000 elections was
lower than expected. About one fourth of the con-
testing 96 women were party members. This ratio
corresponds to the frequency of party membership
among the candidates in general. Although only seven
women became members of the parliament and all
belong to the National Democratic Party, the fact that
they were elected in poor urban and semi-urban areas
is meaningful. In spite of the small number of women
in the parliament, the fact that the second Deputy
Speaker is a woman from the fi’at is also significant.
The only electoral district in which the legislative
authority has not published the result so far is
Alexandria’s al-Raml district, where the first female
15  However, the woman in exchange has to return the bridal
money she has received upon marriage to the husband and
also has to renounce some of her legal rights, as e.g. mainte-
nance. In practice, this limits the circle of women who can
afford a divorce.
candidate of the Muslim Brotherhood was nomi-
nated.16 Most observers are sure that this candidate,
Gihan al-Halafawi, will win. In this case an Islamist
woman would sit in the Egyptian parliament for the
first time.17
Copts18
The constitution does not define a quota for Copts in
elections. This has been consensus since the adoption
of the first constitution in 1923. The latter was drafted
after the 1919 national revolution whose most impor-
tant slogans were “Religion is for god and the home-
land is for all” and “The unity of the crescent and the
cross”.
In fact, Copts have noticeably withdrawn from
political life since the beginning of the religious strife
that started in the mid 1970s and reached its climax
during the 1980s. Although this discord has not
vanished completely, such events have become sparse,
occurring only at long intervals during the 1990s.
Accordingly, signs of improvement in the Copts’
participation in political life during the 1990s can be
observed. The call of the Coptic-orthodox pope that
Coptic physicians shall participate in the elections of
the physicians’ syndicate played an important role in
this respect. It was followed by their visible partici-
pation in the parliamentary elections in 1995. The
2000 elections witnessed for the first time in 25 years
the election of three out of 74 Coptic candidates.19
This may be an indication that the Copts will return to
the political arena and it may be the beginning of nor-
malization between the two religious groups in Egypt.
The liberal Wafd party nominated 12 Coptic
candidates. It was followed by the leftist Tagammu
party which nominated four and the National Demo-
cratic Party which nominated one Coptic candidate.
The three successful Coptic candidates all belong to
the business community. The candidate of the NDP is
16  According to newspaper reports the Muslim Brotherhood
also tried to nominate a Coptic candidate but this finally did
not happen.
17  It is remarkable that the result has not even been pub-
lished as by June 2001.
18  Following the  mainstream discourse in Egypt the term
Copt is used here to denote the whole of the Christian popu-
lation in Egypt although there also is a minority of adherents
to other Christian confessions. Copts had so far mostly been
appointed directly by the president.
19  One-third of the Coptic candidates were party members
while the rest were independents.
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the current Minister of Economy and Foreign Trade
coming from one of the oldest Coptic families
involved in political life, Yussuf Boutros Ghali. The
second businessman, Mounir Fakhri Abdelnour, is the
General Secretary of the Wafd party. The third, Ramy
Lakah, is one of the most eminent businessmen who
acquired the Egyptian nationality besides his Lebanese
origin and ran as an independent candidate.
The current reintegration of the Copts in the politi-
cal arena is thus given a major impetus by members of
the business community. But the Copts’ represen-
tation in the People’s Assembly had never actually
ceased. The president has the right to appoint 10
members to the parliament. Part of them were always
chosen from among Copts and women. This year
Hosni Mubarak appointed four Copts and four
women. It has also been a tradition that an appointed
Coptic member of the parliament chairs the Commit-
tee of Defense and National Security.
Businessmen
During the mid-1980s, about a decade after the first
measures of economic liberalization and privatization
had been introduced, the first generation of big busi-
nessmen started to emerge. Another decade later, they
also began to emerge as political actors as they
became more and more involved in parliamentary
politics. Generally speaking, they substituted those
members of parliament who had held positions in the
public sector.
The participation of businessmen in elections often
raises the issue of the influence of capital on policies
as well as on voters. The donations made during cam-
paigning were estimated to have amounted to about
US$ 1 billion. This revived a stagnant market, but
those donations were not free from suspected bribery
and purchases of parliamentary immunity to
camouflage corruption. Shortly before the elections
and during the preparations for candidacy, a first
instance criminal court passed a sentence in one of
the most serious corruption cases that shook business
and political life. About 23 businessmen, including
three members of the previous parliament and high-
ranking officials, were accused of having embezzled
about 11 billion Egyptian Pounds (about US$ 3
billion). The sentences gave credibility to the govern-
ment’s slogan of “chasing the corrupted regardless of
their influential positions”.
Businessmen won 25 seats in the 2000 elections.
About 50 per cent of them (12 seats) had been running
under the umbrella of the ruling party, while three
had stood for the liberal Wafd party and 10 as
independents (representing about 40 per cent of all
seats won by independents). The Left and the Muslim
Brotherhood did not nominate any businessmen to
represent them. Furthermore, 52 small entrepreneurs
were also elected.
The double nationality carried by some elected
businessmen and two ministers was a ground for
objections before the administrative judicial authority
(the State Council). A sentence was passed in first
instance the membership of one parliamentarian
should be revoked because his second nationality
obliged him to waive his original Egyptian nationality.
The sentence that was based upon the assumption
that “double nationality means double loyalty” raised
controversy in legal and political circles. It has been
the first of its kind since the amendment of the
Nationality Law (by Law No. 26/1975) which allowed to
acquire the nationality of another country. Prior to
the said amendment, citizens were forbidden to
acquire a second nationality and those who did were
considered traitors.
Youth
Several factors led to the emergence of a new gener-
ation with higher skills and more pragmatism in
decision making. Since the mid-1970s efforts were
exerted to develop education structures and curricula
as well as new criteria for employment. Several sectors
of the domestic and foreign labor markets were
opened during the last 25 years, and the state has
given directives since the beginning of the 1990s to
establish a second echelon of leadership in all sectors.
Since, there has been a visible rejuvenation of leader-
ship in both private business and the public sector.
At the political level, the youth secretariats in
addition to those of women, peasants and workers
represent the cornerstones of the political parties’
structures, especially of the NDP. The most important
issue of the election campaigns was the issue of
unemployed university graduates. Youth secretariats
actively directed programs to train young political
cadres not only in the parties but also in universities,
trade unions, professional syndicates and non-govern-
mental organizations. These efforts started to bear
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fruit during the last elections. Younger and more vital
faces replaced almost two-thirds of the previous
Assembly. Alone 100 out the NDP’s 444 nominated
candidates were younger than 42 years.20 Thus the
widespread image of a rigid and immobile Egyptian
political elite firmly rooted in the apparatus of an
authoritarian state conceals the strong mobility of a
new generation striving to be a major player in
Egyptian politics.
Absent ... but present groups
Although the law, not the constitution, still denies
members of the army, police, intelligence agencies,
diplomats and members of the judicial authority the
right to vote or stand for election as long as they are in
office, these groups are conspicuously present. In
campaigning, one frequently finds signs with titles
such as “Elect Brigadier General...” or “Vote for Coun-
selor...” without any reference that these are former
titles. In the 2000 elections, 21 former police officers,
six former army officers and three former judges
entered the parliament.
20  There are no statistical data available concerning the age
of the actually elected members of the Assembly.
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Horizons of Political Reform
The horizons of political reform presented here are
linked with two different time frames. The first is
urgent and concerns changes within the framework of
the present constitution. The second is anticipated
and regards changes of the constitution itself. The
agenda of reform departs from demands of the
opposition as voiced at different occasions and is
woven into a reading of what is likely to happen in
Egypt’s political arena in the nearer future. The
agenda covers two main fields of action: the state
structure, i.e., the relationship between state and
society on the one hand, and the state identity, i.e., the
socioeconomic foundation of the regime on the other.
Short-term Horizon
The reform agenda on the short term may be sum-
marized as follows: the reform of the economic
system, structural reform of the political parties,
amendment of the law for political parties and the law
regulating NGOs as well as promoting the citizens’
participation in elections and civic organizations.
These reforms need to accommodate the Islamic
current which represents the major challenge to the
regime and whose strive for political activity should
be accounted for in the party law as well as in the law
regulating civil society activities.
At the political level, the declaration of the state of
emergency with its arsenal of exceptional laws and
institutions, is an insurmountable obstacle on the
road towards genuine pluralization and democrati-
zation. The institutions of the state agree that the
current state of emergency is necessary due to the
unstable regional circumstances and the cold peace
with Israel.21 Nevertheless the process of pluralization
is going on even under these conditions.
In the short run, the Supreme Constitutional Court
emerges as the most important agent of change. This
21  Correspondingly, the Supreme Court in 1992 ruled that
the president’s power to declare and renew the state of
emergency is constitutional. Also the NDP-dominated parlia-
ment always agrees to a renewal of the state of emergency,
despite the resistance of the opposition parties which usually
vote against the renewal.  
is a dialectical process in which the Supreme Court
legitimizes certain laws that contradict the con-
stitution. The Court thus undermines the respective
constitutional provisions and thereby creates the
necessity for the construction of new constitutional
norms.
The Economic System and The Supreme
Constitutional Court as Agent of Change
The economic reform issue provides good examples to
illustrate this role of the Supreme Constitutional
Court. Thus in one of its rulings the Court interpreted
the constitution in favor of privatization. The decision
granted constitutional legality to government
measures in this direction although they are in clear
contradiction with the constitutional provisions that
prescribe the public sector as the main base for all
economic development. Another ruling shook the
principle of fixed contracts in the fields of real-estate
leasing and labor law. The contracting system that
prevailed between the owner and the tenant of agri-
cultural lands or real estate for commercial or
residency purposes was based on three principles:
(a) the state determined a rental value on the basis of
the real estate tax, (b) the period of lease was infinite,
and (c) the lease agreement was inheritable. The
Court’s judgement abrogated the last principle in
order to ease the way for the liberalization of leasing
contracts. This will affect the positions of many social
groups on the one hand, and will introduce a different
formula for ownership and possession on the other.
In the same way, the rules that labor contracs
between the state and its employees were based on
began to change gradually from the state’s commit-
ment to employ any university graduate to employ-
ment through contests. Labor law also changed from
resolute regulations that realize job security for the
employee and adopt seniority as a basis for promotion,
to more flexible regulations that take efficiency and
individual initiative as a basis for promotion. How-
ever, wages and salaries are still restrained. In this
context another ruling of the Constitutional Court
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stated that it is unconstitutional to fix a maximum
level for the compensation of the top management in
the public sector companies. Similarly, it ruled that it
is against the constitution to deprive an employee of
the right to receive a pension and salary at the same
time.
Reform of the Political Parties
In order to give an impetus to the structural reform of
the current political parties, the president of the
republic will have to give up chairing the ruling party
and to restore the situation that existed at the begin-
ning of the experiment of pluralism in 1976 when the
prime minister, not the president, chaired the ruling
party. It would be a beginning of both separating the
party apparatus from the state apparatus and the
withdrawal from the one-party profile. This reform
requires, as mentioned earlier, horizontal and vertical
action. Horizontally, the party membership should be
made autonomous and should not be gained just by
virtue of certain executive positions. Several steps
were made in this direction. Vertically, the party
leaders should be chosen by elections from the
bottom, not imposed by the top. Steps taken in this
direction have been slow so far. However, there were
signs of intentions to introduce change after the
election in 2000.
The major opposition parties, namely the liberal
Wafd, the Tagammu’ and the Nasserist are suffering
from the same symptoms. Their leadership has not
changed for decades and sometimes the party’s chair-
man is even elected for lifetime. Old renowned
families or elder-men networks determine the leader-
ship. Promotion happens through appointment from
the top rather than by elections from the bottom.
Party meetings are sparse and irregular. Party
activities are limited to their newspapers and party
headquarters.
But this is only the surface of a quiet river that
hides the apparent agility and vitality of a young
generation, i.e., those who are between 30 and 42
years of age. A look at the second echelon of leader-
ship will not miss those young people and new cadres
who have put on their agenda to remedy the afore-
mentioned symptoms. The remedy lies in more
internal democracy, reducing favoritism and
rewarding efficiency as well as independent initiative
and finally aiming at installing a team of leaders
instead of resorting to one charismatic leader.
This emergent elite did not come from a vacuum. It
is the output of programs prepared by all parties as
well as other institutions during the 1990s in what
seemed a general approach towards building a second
echelon of leadership. These cadre-building programs
have now begun to bear fruit. The election of the
leadership of the Wafd last year symbolized this
process. After the death of its lifelong leader Fuad Siraj
Eddin who was one of the most eminent political
leaders before the 1952 revolution, the party’s young
second echelon of leadership played a decisive part in
the multi-candidates election. They successfully
backed a middle-aged professor of law against the
brother of the deceased leader who is almost his age.
The third candidate was also a descendent of one of
the oldest families known for their historical support
for the Wafd party.
Internal reform is necessary as an initial step on the
road towards democratization especially for the ruling
party. No less important is the retreat of the ruling
party from the state and the retreat of the opposition
parties from their newspapers and party headquarters
to broaden their bases and “renew their blood”. This
makes it necessary for the state to relax its tight grip
on political action in the universities, trade unions
and NGOs.
The Party Law
One of the most apparent features of the Egyptian
party system is the abundant number of inactive
parties on the one hand, and the limitations and
unlawful character of the Islamic parties on the other.
The law that regulates the foundation of political
parties is one of the main reasons for this status quo.
The law delegates the power of issuing party licences
and monitoring their political activities to an adminis-
trative committee (the Parties Affairs Committee).22
This entitles the committee to freeze a party’s
activities and funds and to close down party head-
quarters. Although the parties have the right to chal-
lenge the administrative committee’s decisions before
22  The six-member committee is chaired by the Speaker of
the Shura Council and it comprises the Minister of Justice,
the Minister of Interior, the Minister for Parliamentary
Affairs as well as two former judicial consultants chosen by
the president.
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the administrative judicial authority (the State
Council), the council’s decisions are not binding to the
committee. It can refer the investigation to the Public
Socialist Prosecutor who will undertake action against
these parties before the exceptional Court of Values.
Both institutions belong to the extraordinary judicial
system and were established in the 1980s.
The committee issued licences for parties that can
now easily be called “parties on paper”. The bigger
parties call them “in-vitro parties” because they had
an “unnatural” birth. These parties are 11 out of the
15 existing parties. On the other hand the committee
was close-fisted in issuing licences for political move-
ments that are indeed present in the political arena.
The Nasserist party for example was not able to obtain
a licence until 1992, after an administrative court
ruling and after the committee refrained from filing
action before the Court of Values.23
Also the al-Wasat party, which observers regard as
one attempt of parts of the Muslim Brotherhood to
enter the political scene, has been waiting for a
licence for more than five years.
In July 2000, the Parties Affairs Committee issued a
decree freezing the activities of the Labor party,
known for its Islamist tendencies, after it had
launched a press campaign against a novel published
by the Ministry of Culture. The campaign accused this
novel of being an offense to Islam and incited a violent
wave of student protests. The committee’s decision,
which is still in force, prevented the Labor party from
nominating its candidates for the elections. Some of
them stood as independent candidates, similar to
members of the Muslim Brotherhood that has not yet
applied for obtaining a licence to establish a legal
political party. They seem to be satisfied at present
with testing the intentions through the al-Wasat party
after the Supreme Constitutional Court in 1992 had
rejected a claim filed by the Brotherhood against its
unconstitutional dissolution in 1954.24
But there are indications that the Muslim Brother-
hood is willing to integrate into the party system. For
example, the movement changed its motto from the
1980s, “Islam is the Solution”, to “Reform through
Respect of the Constitution in Text and Spirit” during
23  All parties that successfully applied for a licence so far
had to go through the same process of rejection by the com-
mittee in the first place which then was revoked by a ruling
of the administrative court.
24  The Court saw that the dissolution decision preceded the
promulgation of the constitution that governs the Court
(1971).
the 2000 election. In addition, the method of partici-
pation and the declarations of the Brotherhood during
the last elections indicated their desire for recon-
ciliation. As a matter of fact, the legal accommodation
of the Brotherhood remains a big challenge. In this
context, demands to amend the party law is part of
the agenda to release the administration’s grip on
granting licences for new parties and monitoring
existing ones. A law amendment should also establish
new rules to sift out the idle parties and allow for a
space of action for active underground movements
that aim to work publicly.
Will it be possible to return to the rules that were
in force at the beginning of the multi-party system?
According to these rules, any party seeking a licence
had to receive the approval of at least 20 members of
parliament. This was the case with the Wafd party and
the Labor party. Or, will the whole subject be left
entirely in the hands to the judiciary, as was the case
with the Nasserist party that was only established
after a court ruling? Or, will new rules be sought?
Whatever the case might be, what is needed is to lift
the trusteeship of the administrative committee. The
Supreme Constitutional Court may play a decisive role
here again as it did when in the early 1990s it
abolished the condition that a party has to approve
the peace agreement with Israel.
Civil Society Organizations in a Vacuum
The Egyptian field of non-governmental activities com-
prises three categories: In addition to hundreds of
non-governmental organizations (NGOs) acting in
social and religious care under the financial and
administrative auspices of the government, two
parallel categories of organizations emerged during
the 1990s. One of them is a semi-formal group of
organizations acting in social fields such as mother-
hood, childhood, the family and woman under the
patronage of the First Lady. They rely on their own
initiatives for financing their activities, especially
fundraising in the Egyptian business community. The
last, most autonomous category includes dozens of
organizations that were established successively since
the end of the 1990s, works outside the official legal
frame that has been set up for NGOs and embraces
hundreds of activists. In order to avoid strict financial
and administrative supervision by the government,
these organizations do not register under law No. 32/
Short-term Horizon
SWP-Berlin
Political Change in Egypt
Juli 2001
21
1964 but as civil companies. They are involved in
social, political and trade union activities and are
financed from abroad. Most human rights organiza-
tions and research institutes fall into this category.
Their foreign funding amounts to about 10 per cent of
the total foreign grants to the private sector, i.e.,
totalling US$ 30 million (Ibrahim 2000).
In order to unite these different organizational
varieties of NGOs under a common umbrella, a joint
committee combining representatives from the
government and from these organizations was formed
for consultation and negotiation on a draft law. When
the new law governing NGOs was issued on May 17th,
1999, it caused a split between these organizations
and inside each of them. Supporters found that it was
possible to work within the limits set by the new law,
while the opponents held the opinion that the law
would impose governmental trusteeship over NGOs
and that they would have to subject to the govern-
ment’s financial and administrative supervision. They
also saw that the law’s provision stating that NGOs
should not be involved in activities allocated for
political parties and trade unions would allow for a
wide range of interpretations and put the NGOs under
direct threat. However, this law was enforced for a few
months only because the Supreme Constitutional
Court then ruled it unconstitutional. The decision was
based on procedural grounds. The court considered
that the law should have been submitted to the Majlis
ash-Shura prior to its adoption and issuance. The
NGOs are now acting in a vacuum.
The relationship between the government and
NGOs working in the fields of research and human
rights has in general not been very good. It was domi-
nated by mutual mistrust, and security as well as
judicial actions were taken against some of their
leaders occasionally during the last years. In 2000,
tensions have increased and the situation has become
even more polarized. Some of the NGOs working in
social care started to cooperate more and more with
other semi-formal organizations under the umbrella
of the National Councils for women, child- and
motherhood. Other NGOs faced mounting pressure
concerning their research, human rights activities and
financing. Saad Eddin Ibrahim, Chairman of the Ibn
Khaldun Center for Development Studies, 25 was
25  The Ibn Khaldun Center’s main concerns have always
been to promote democracy and civil society groups. In this
context, the Center addressed sensitive issues as the status of
Copts and monitored the 1995 parliamentary  elections. The
charges ranged from accepting funding from the EU without
detained in July 2000 and tried before the Supreme
State Security Court later that year. As a professor at
the American University in Cairo, and an inter-
nationally renowned sociologist, his case has attracted
international attention.
Allegations and counter-allegations in the NGO
field have always been connected with two principal
issues: (a) foreign funding and monitoring, and
(b) limits of action with regard to issues of national
concern. A law that deals with these two points is
needed urgently in order to finally regulate and unify
the legal bases for the action of all civil society organi-
zations in Egypt. The emergence of a draft law will
depend to a large extent on negotiations between
three parties: the government, the donor community
and the NGOs.
Several thousand of NGO cadres have proven their
efficiency during the 1990s. The NGO elite then
provided the leaders of the newly created semi-formal
organizations. New programs in fields as literacy,
micro-credits for the poor, social care for aged or
handicapped people and the promotion of women
permission and mismanagement of funds to forging election
registration cards and tarnishing Egypt’s image abroad. Saad
Eddin Ibrahim was sentenced to seven years of hard labor in
May 2001. Four other associates of the Ibn Khaldun Center
were sentenced to hard labor ranging from four to five years,
while the sentences of one year of hard labor for 21 staff
members of the Center were suspended. The court’s
reasoning has not been published as by May 2001 and possi-
bilities of appeal are still examined. The judgement provoked
critical reactions both inside and outside Egypt by politicians,
newspapers and alike, and the case is being fiercely discussed
among the different political currents in Egypt. The case is
also especially delicate because Saad Eddin Ibrahim posesses
the American citizenship aside the Egyptian one.  For more
detailed information on the case see press coverage, e.g.
Nadia Abou El-Magd, “Seven Years”, in Al-Ahram Weekly Online
24–30 May 2001.
In this context, it is important to note the sensitivity of
external intervention through statements of condemnation
or other measures. Cases like the one of Saad Eddin Ibrahim
are very often considered to be internal affairs that reflect
inner-Egyptian struggles over values etc. not only by the
authorities, but also and maybe even more so by society.
Thus, the very same Egyptian human rights organisations
that unanimously condemned the ruling against Saad Eddin
Ibrahim, also unanimously boycotted the Committee for
Religious Freedoms of the US Congress that visited Egypt in
March 2001. The Committee had been sent to Egypt to
investigate the status of Copts in Egypt and then to report to
the Congress who was to decide about the amount of aid
given to Egypt. The visit was seen as counterproductive rather
than beneficial for the delicate relations between state and
society.
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were launched. The new law should empower the
NGOs to take their own financial and administrative
decisions without centralized control. The new law
should also create possibilities of participation for
human rights and trade union activists who have
effectively accumulated valuable experiences of
political engagement in domestic and foreign affairs.
Plurality and autonomy are beneficial and are even a
precondition for building confidence between the
government and the NGOs, regrouping a diversity of
liberal, Islamic and leftist currents. These NGOs are
needed by the state as much as they are needed by
society.
Long-term Horizon: Constitutional Reforms
Strengthening the Assembly vis-à-vis the Presidency
Taking an optimistic approach, one can expect that
the composition of the next parliament (2005–2010) is
going to change even more substantially. It is likely
that the NDP, for the first time, will not gain a two-
thirds majority. This would be a good base for con-
stitutional reforms. A two-third majority is necessary,
for example, to nominate a candidate for the presi-
dency. The next parliament will find on the top of its
agenda the renewal of the president’s term for
another period (2006–2012) and it may determine the
number of presidency terms which is unlimited so
far.26 Another issue up for reform is the current
system for the election of a president which is still by
referendum, i.e., with only one candidate. Instead,
there should be direct, multi-candidate elections. Both
issues need the amendment of the constitution. Aside
from the Assembly, the Majlis as-Shura will have to
play a major role in this respect.
Contentious Issues and Common Demands
Since its amendment at the beginning of the 1980s,
the constitution that determines the guiding prin-
ciples of the country’s economic order puts more
emphasis on ‘democracy’ than on ‘socialism’. Never-
26  Anwar Sadat changed the previous provision which
limited the presidency to two successive periods. He justified
this amendment, which he did not live long enough to
benefit from, by the need to stabilize the top authority
during a stage of transformation.
The Parliament and the President
According to the constitution, the Assembly
nominates the president with at least a two-third
majority. The presidential candidate then has to be
confirmed in a public referendum. With the same
majority the Assembly may accuse the president of
high treason or charge him with any criminal act,
delegate the legislative power to him and pass laws
which the president has rejected and returned to
the Assembly. The president, on the other hand,
may dissolve the assembly after this has been con-
firmed in a public referendum. He can also refer
matters of the country’s supreme interests to a
referendum. In practice however, President
Mubarak, who has been in power since 1981, is not
only the president of the republic but at the same
time chairman of the NDP which has never
occupied less than 80 per cent of the parliamentary
seats since the introduction of the multiparty
system in 1976.
theless, it took the government and the Left, as
represented especially in extra-parliamentary insti-
tutions like the trade unions, about 10 years to reach
an agreement on economic liberalization and privati-
zation programs. The motto of the Left changed from
“Protecting the public sector” to “Treating the social
impacts of the economic reform programs”. But new
contentious issues were brought up by the liberals27
who saw that the provisions of the current constitu-
tion do not suffice to secure private ownership against
risks of confiscation and nationalization. They also
regarded the allocation of 50 per cent of the elected
councils’ seats for workers and peasants as no longer
suitable for a system that moved from what was called
“Alliance of the forces of the working people” to
liberalization and multi-partism. This, however, is
unacceptable for the Left which will defend the exist-
ing “socialist” provisions against any attempts to
abolish them.
Disagreement between the liberals and the Left is
becoming less sharp over matters concerning public
freedoms. This includes (a) the right of association
instead of the present regulations discriminating
against associations, societies, unions, trade unions
and parties, and (b) the right of free movement for all
individuals. There is an increasing consensus to
27  In the economic field this includes the members of the
Muslim Brotherhood.
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demand that the currently publicized motto of the
state − “State of institutions and supremacy of law” −
be implemented. The opposition demands a reform of
the state structure that would diversify and decentral-
ize power in executive and decision-making processes
and open the system to bottom-up influence so as to
transform the authoritarian presidential regime into a
semi-parliamentary one. There are also demands to
reduce the legislative authority of the president, to
give the majority party a right to say in forming the
government, to grant the parliament the right to
make changes to the general budget of the state, and
to abolish the president’s authority to appoint the
provincial governors.
Moreover, it is expected that there will be demands
that the president should not preside over the higher
councils of military organizations (the army and the
police), and especially not over the Higher Council
of Judicial Authorities. As has been demanded also
by Egypt’s judges, the role of the Higher Council of
Judicial Authorities should be activated and be
charged with the administrative, technical and
financial supervision of judges of the first instance
courts and the courts of appeal with regard to their
transfer, promotion and salaries instead of leaving all
these functions in the hands of the Ministry of Justice.
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Concluding Reflections
Egypt provides an example of a country that is trans-
forming from an authoritarian system to a system
with more liberal features. This transformation is
taking place through a gradual process closely
connected to changes in the regional and inter-
national environment. It can be called a process of
pluralization in which the single decision-maker or
the single institution is “de-monopolized”. This break-
up leaves multiple institutional units on the hori-
zontal level behind. On the vertical level, i.e., within
the institutions, it will bring the second and third-
rank elite up. The Egyptian experience shows that this
happens faster in economic than in political institu-
tions. In any case, the pluralization of decision-making
institutions brings about competition and negotia-
tions on the economic and political resources between
the emerging units. This could lead to the creation of
democratic values in order to manage the differences
between the units. Here the role of the judiciary
emerges to ensure a transition towards the rule of law.
The same phenomenon can be witnessed within
society. A transition is taking place from few major
collective units (like the tribe, the extended family,
the guilds) to many smaller social groups who shelter
the individual. This heavily influences decision-
making and representation within these groups since
it is no longer the patriarch alone who takes major
decisions on political or social issues on behalf of his
subordinates. The individual emancipates him- or her-
self from the family legacy prescribing education,
work, marriage, place of living. Two factors are respon-
sible for the mobility of the individual: education and
the spread of capitalist values. In order to raise his
income, the individual now depends on his own
efforts. This leads to an identity based on one’s own
choice of work according to norms which are based on
individual initiative and competition. These new
norms are becoming more important than the solidar-
ity of the former social unit. Eventually, these people
will ask for adequate modes of representation and
political participation replacing the traditional mode.
The change of the status of women best reflects the
process of de-monopolizing the single decision-maker.
Traditionally, women have been the core of the
extended family which functioned on the basis of
patriarchy and at the same time preserved it. With the
spread of the nuclear family and as women are
increasingly given individual rights in both public and
private spheres, the power of patriarchy declines.
Thus, women make up for a third of the cast votes in
Egypt and more than 20 per cent of the workforce. The
increase in girls’ education28 liberates girls more and
more from the power of the father. Law 1/2000 gave
women the right to demand a divorce before the court
without specified reason. One and half million women
have currently filed a case in a family court, that is
more than 10 per cent of all families. Two-thirds of
them are petitions for divorce.29 Law 1/2000 supports
women in their own decision-making and lifts them
from the paternal guardianship. It can be regarded as
the basis for a change of values in society and a new
social contract.
Especially in urban areas individuals are more and
more independent from primordial groups − a fact
which is paradoxically partly reflected in the low voter
turn-out in the cities. In order to integrate people who
identify and act increasingly as individuals, different
forms of mobilization and participation are needed.
The current marginalization of this category of people
will in the long run create pressure for reforming the
dominant culture of decision-making at all levels of
socialization, i.e., family, school, university, party,
trade union, to enable their participation.
The emergent pluralism visible in state and society
is represented in an emergent new elite sometimes
referred to as “generation of peace” and sometimes as
the “generation of globalisation” or “future”. This
generation has now reached the second and third
rank positions within the most important state insti-
tutions, and to a lesser extent in political parties and
trade unions. The question is to what extent this new
elite has found a common political agenda. But in any
case it urgently wants to surface.
28  Analphabetism among women decreased from 71 per cent
in 1985 to 58.2 per cent in 1998 (UNDP 2000).
29  The new law facilitates the proceedings which had
formerly taken ten years on average especially since the
woman had to prove that her husband was either impotent,
absent or violent.
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